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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2003, part-time employment in Australia accounted for over 42% of the Australian 
female workforce, nearly 17% of the male workforce, and represented 28% of total 
employment.  Of the OECD countries, only the Netherlands has a higher proportion of 
working women employed part-time and Australia tops the OECD league in terms of its 
proportion of working men who are part-time. In this paper we investigate part-time full-
time hourly wage gaps using important new panel data from the new Household Income 
and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey. We find that the usual negative part-time 
wage penalty found in other countries is not found in Australia once unobserved 
individual heterogeneity has been taken into account. Instead, part-time men and women 
typically earn an hourly pay premium.  This result survives our numerous robustness 
checks and we advance some hypotheses as to why there is a positive part-time pay 
premium. 
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1. Introduction
In 2003, part-time employment in Australia accounted for over 42% of the 
Australian female workforce, nearly 17% of the male workforce, and represented 28% of 
total employment (OECD, 2004).  Of the OECD countries, only the Netherlands has a 
higher proportion of working women employed part-time and Australia tops the OECD 
league in terms of its proportion of working men who are part-time.1  Against this 
background, our aim is to investigate whether there is, in Australia, a pay premium or 
penalty associated with part-time work relative to full-time work. We also explore the 
degree to which observed pay gaps differ by gender. 
Part-time jobs are often viewed as bad jobs with low pay and little career 
prospects. Studies based on representative survey data typically find a part-time pay 
penalty (see for example see Simpson (1986), Main (1988), Blank (1990), Ermisch and 
Wright (1992) and for a review of US studies see Hirsch (2004)). However more recent 
analysis by Hirsch (2004), using US panel data, finds little evidence of a pay gap between 
part-time and full-time women but he does find a part-time pay penalty for men. And 
Rodgers (2004), using cross-sectional data from Wave 1 of the Household Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, finds no evidence of a part-time pay 
penalty for either men or women. 
In this paper we use important new panel data from the first two waves of the 
Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. Two advantages 
of these data are that they provide a very rich set of controls and they allow for estimation 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Our estimates reveal that part-time men and 
women in Australia typically earn a statistically significant hourly wage premium.  This 
result survives our numerous robustness checks and in the conclusion of the paper we 
discuss some theories consistent with these stylized facts.  
To start with, it is useful to review the various hypotheses about the determinants 
of part-time/full-time wage differentials. Some suggest that part-time work should be 
associated with a penalty, while others suggest it might command a premium. Although 
all depend on the interaction of demand and supply factors, we group them below under 
the broad headings of firms’ preferences, workers’ preferences, institutional factors and 
measurement issues. 
 
                                                          
1 According to the OECD Employment Outlook (2004:310), the OECD average for 2003 was 25% for 
women and 7% for men.   
 1
1. Demand side factors  
1.1. Fixed employment costs might mean firms prefer employees to work longer 
hours in order to recoup hiring and setup costs. According to this hypothesis, 
there should be a penalty to part-time work. 
1.2. However the efficiency hours hypothesis can predict the reverse. Suppose there 
is a hill-shaped relationship between hourly efficiency and the number of hours 
worked in a day or a week, as suggested by Booth and Ravallion (1993) in the 
debate on effects of hours cuts. Then part-time work could be associated with a 
pay premium. 
1.3. Some firms’ production schedules require part-time workers for demand peaks. 
For example, supermarkets and restaurants have variable demand, which might 
be best met by part-time workers. If there is a fixed supply of such workers, any 
wage gap will reflect relative demand and supply factors.2  
1.4. Firms might have more market power over part-time workers than full-time 
workers. For example, part-timers might have childcare commitments 
constraining them to seek work close to home. This could give employers a 
greater degree of market power over part-time workers. 
2. Supply-side factors  
2.1  According to human capital theory, individuals who anticipate working part-time 
will invest less in education than those who intend to work full-time. In addition, 
part-time workers accumulate experience capital at a lower rate than full-time 
workers, because they supply fewer hours. We should therefore observe a part-
time pay penalty, as part-time workers have lower levels of both human and 
experience capital.  
2.2  Part-time work might suit worker’s heterogeneous preferences (which can of 
course be affected by policy and we return to this below). Whether or not there 
are wage differentials depends on the supply of workers who prefer part-time 
work and the demand for them. 
                                                          
2 Firms that are able to offer a range of part-time and full-time jobs might face better choice of workers. In 
countries where part-time work is preferred by many workers, firms could tinker the mix of jobs according 
to preferences of local labour supply. Firms in good position to offer part-time jobs might be in strong 
bargaining position to drive down part-time pay. Firms in poor positions might have to increase part-time 
pay. 
 
 2
3. Institutional factors 
3.1  Australia has been characterized by a unique award system of rates of pay (see 
Pocock, 1995, for a summary of how this affected women in particular). Award 
provisions relating to part-time employment were largely designed to meet the 
needs of the industry concerned as well as to protect future employment of both 
part-time and full-time employees (Hawke, 1993).  A possible outcome of this 
might have been that part-time workers received the benefits of the annual award 
system for covered workers quite independently of their union status. However 
the importance of this system has diminished over recent time, and in particular 
with the passage of the 1996 Workplace Relations Act that explicitly emphasized 
workplace bargaining between employer and employee without union or state 
intervention.3  
3.2  In Australia, effective marginal tax rates are high for relatively low-skilled 
second earners (Apps, 2004). Consequently firms requiring part-time workers 
may have to pay more to attract marginal workers into market-sector 
employment. 
4. Measurement issues 
Finally, there are measurement issues to do with the total compensation package 
received by part-time and full-time workers. Part-time workers might receive non-
wage benefits that differ from those offered to full-time workers. While Australian 
firms do not offer health insurance to their employees, casual workers do frequently 
receive buy-outs for holiday and sick pay. However we have information about this in 
our data set, and so we are able to control for casual status in regressions of hourly 
wages. 
 
2. The Data, Variables and Raw Part-Time Wage Gap
2.1 The data and variables 
We use data from Waves 1 and 2 of the new Household Income and Labour 
Dynamics (HILDA) survey, a nationally representative random-sample survey of private 
                                                          
3The 1996 Workplace Relations Act introduced Australian Workplace Agreements, whereby workers might 
be expected to sign an individual contract and forfeit award coverage. These new workplace agreements 
were supposed to match the existing award conditions. While the Industrial Relations Commission can 
review and recommend change, or reject agreements, it is no longer able to set minima for part-time work 
or set precedents in terms of regulations. In addition, the Act weakened legal recognition of unions with 
respect to rights of entry and representation.  
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households in Australia spanning the period 2001-2.4 Our analysis covers full-time and 
part-time employees aged between 18 and 60 years in Wave 1, who are not in the armed 
forces, farming or fisheries, and with valid information on our main variables (hours of 
work, salary, and whether casual or permanent). Individuals reporting over 100 working 
hours per week (hours are used to derive hourly wages) were dropped, as were full-time 
students. Where there were many missing observations for control variables, we created 
dummy variables indicating their status, to maintain reasonable sample sizes. We use a 
balanced panel of respondents who are present - and satisfy the selection criteria - in both 
waves. Our estimating sample comprises 1994 women and 2034 men, representing 3988 
person-year observations for women and 4068 person-year observations for men. 
Our measure of part-time work is based on individual responses for their usual 
hours of work in their main job (including any paid or unpaid overtime, and work done at 
the workplace and at home). Part-time workers are defined as those usually working 
fewer than 35 hours per week (where we follow the Australian Bureau of Statistics cutoff 
of fewer than 35 hours rather than the OECD cutoff of 30). 
The hourly wage refers to the hourly wage in the main job.5 Wave 2 wages were 
deflated to 2001 (wave 1) levels using the headline Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. Respondents earning less than $1 or more than $100 have 
been omitted from the analysis. 
Table A.1 in the Data Appendix gives the means of some of the variables of 
interest, disaggregated by gender and by full-time or part-time employment status. Full-
time women work on average 42.09 hours per week and earn an average hourly wage of 
A$17.22, while part-time women work 20.58 hours to earn A$16.41. This compares with 
full-time men who work 45.31 hours (earning A$19.75) and part-time men who work on 
average 20.43 hours (and earn A$16.09). A greater proportion of part-time workers of 
both sexes are casual (43% of women and 63% of men). Casual workers in Australia are 
defined as those who are ineligible for sick and holiday pay entitlement and who are 
                                                          
4 The survey is a longitudinal study of representative households in Australia.  Wave 1 comprised 7682 
households with 13,969 respondents aged 15 years and over.  For Wave 2, interviews were conducted in 
7245 households with 11,993 respondents continuing from Wave 1 and 1048 new respondents.  The 
attrition rate between Waves 1 and 2 was 13.2 per cent. HILDA contains four survey instruments; the 
household form, a household questionnaire, a person questionnaire and the self-completion questionnaire. 
The information at the household level can be provided by any adult member of the household but 
preferably a person with knowledge of the household finances. The person-level questionnaires are for all 
persons aged 15 years and over in the household. 
5 The log wage was calculated from the HILDA variables as log (hourly wage) = log {gross annual salary 
in main job /[(52.14)*(usual weekly hours in main job including overtime)]}. No specific information is 
provided on overtime hours and premia. Notice that 52.14 = 365 days per year divided by 7 days per week. 
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usually paid a wage premium as a compensating differential.6 Proportionately more full-
time workers are on fixed term contracts and working on a regular daytime schedule. 
Some 94% of full-time women and men have only one job, as compared with 84% and 
76% of part-time women and men respectively. Fewer part-time workers of both sexes 
are on standard daytime schedules and slightly more full-time workers are on fixed term 
contracts. 
There are also some interesting differences across demographic and educational 
variables. Proportionately more married and cohabiting women work part-time while 
more married or cohabiting men work full-time. Full-time women and men are on 
average just over 38 years old, while part-time women are 39 and part-time men 36. 
Experience and tenure levels are fairly similar for full-time and part-time women, but 
part-time men are less experienced and have lower tenure levels than full-time men who 
have the highest levels of these variables. Finally, note that full-time women have higher 
educational levels than full-time men; 36% of full-time women and 27% of full-time men 
have at least a university degree and above, as compared with 24% of part-time women 
and men; ie there are only 3 percentage points difference between the percentage of full-
time men with degrees and the percentages of part-time workers with degrees. 
 
2.2 The distribution of hours and hourly wages 
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) give the distribution of usual weekly hours worked in the 
main job for women and men respectively (where observations are pooled across waves). 
For both men and women there is a spike at 40 hours per week, but female hours are also 
more dispersed across the lower part of the distribution. In addition, there are small 
spikes at five hourly intervals, as is usual in reported hours per week. 
 
                                                          
6 Wooden and Warren (2003) emphasize the importance of distinguishing between causal work, fixed term 
contracts and temporary agency work. HILDA is particularly appropriate for studying part-time/full-time 
wage gaps, owing to the fact that usual pay and hours information is given for the main job (facilitating 
classification into part-time based on hours in main job), and that there is a very rich set of other controls 
potentially affecting wage determination, including casual and contract status. Clearly the richer the set of 
controls, the lower is unobserved heterogeneity.  
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Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show mean hourly wages by hours worked across the 
distribution (from 0 to 60 hours). Inspection of these figures reveals first, that there is 
considerable noise at hourly intervals not divisible by five (fewer workers are observed at 
these points) and also at the bottom of the hours distribution. Second, there is a relatively 
flat profile especially over the interval 5-50 hours for women. This is in contrast to results 
for the US found by Hirsch (2004), where hourly wages increased across the hours 
distribution and especially so for men. Third, men have a slight jump in hourly wages at 
around 35-40 hours per week but the effect is barely discernible for women. Finally, there 
is a slight tendency for hourly wages to decline with hours worked for women supplying 
more than 50 hours per week and men supplying more than 40 hours per week, perhaps 
reflecting the fact that some of these workers are not paid for overtime hours (as happens 
with some salaried workers). 
 6
Figure 2(a) 
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3. Part-Time/Full-Time Wage Gap Estimates
3.1 The econometric model 
Our estimating equation, which incorporates the influences of various observed 
and unobserved characteristics on the log of hourly wages, is given by:  
 itiititit PXw εµαβ +++′=ln       (1)  
where i=1,…,N represents the number of individuals at each wave and t=1,2 is the 
number of waves. Note that Xit is a vector of characteristics that influence the outcome 
variable wit; the associated parameter vector is β; Pit denotes part-time employment 
status; µi is an unobserved individual-specific effect; and εit is a random error term. The 
parameter of interest is α. 
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 Cross-sectional estimation of equation (1) is likely to produce biased estimates of 
α, since individuals are likely to self-select into full-time employment status based on 
unobservable factors. Suppose that µi denotes an individual’s ability in market production 
relative to home production and µi is fixed over time. Suppose further that this is 
negatively correlated with self-selection into part-time jobs and positively correlated with 
hourly wages. Then the estimated coefficient for part-time work in a cross-sectional 
regression will be negatively biased through the omission of any control for unobserved 
µ. Once control has been taken of unobserved heterogeneity through  estimation of 
equation (1) using appropriate panel data  models, we would expect that the part-time 
wage gap would become larger, ceteris paribus. Since failure to control appropriately for 
unobservables will result in omitted variable bias to the coefficient α, we utilise panel 
data techniques to control for unobserved heterogeneity. We then compare these with the 
estimates obtained from ordinary least squares (OLS) using pooled person-year 
observations. 
 
3.2 The estimates 
We estimate the models separately by gender. The results are reported in Table 1 
for the five different specifications described in the notes under the table. For each 
specification we give the pooled estimates, the random effects (RE) estimates and the 
fixed effects (FE) estimates.7  For readers interested in the impact of other variables, we 
report in Appendix Table A.2 the full set of estimates from Specification [3]. The first 
panel of Table 1 gives the estimates from Specification [1], which includes only a 
constant and the part-time work dummy variable. The pooled OLS estimates show a 
statistically significant negative effect of part-time work on hourly wages. The RE 
estimate is positive but insignificant for women and negative and statistically significant 
for men. However, the FE estimate – preferred across all specifications based on the tests 
reported under Table A.2 in the Appendix – is statistically significant and positive for 
both men and women.  
                                                          
7 FE is consistent when µi  and the xijt are correlated, whereas consistency of random effects estimation 
hinges on orthogonality of µi  and the xijt . Random effects estimation assumes that the distribution of the 
random effects conditional on the covariates has a standard normal distribution with zero mean and 
constant variance. This assumption could be relaxed by allowing for correlation between the unobserved 
heterogeneity and included covariates by, for example, including time-means of the covariates as additional 
regressors (Chamberlain, 1980). However, since we only have two waves of data, there is not enough 
variation in the time-means of the covariates to enable us to account for possible correlation.  We have 
therefore not followed this route. 
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Table 1: Estimates of Part-time/Full-time Log Wage Differential 
 Women  Men  
Specification Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
1. Part-time and constant only     
Pooled -.048*** 3.91 -.205*** 8.72 
RE .005 0.38 -.040 1.81 
FE .127*** 6.14 .128*** 4.39 
     
2. base plus individual 
characteristics 
    
Pooled -.002 0.14 -.052** 2.00 
RE .032** 2.28 .033 1.39 
FE .128*** 5.94 .146*** 4.83 
     
3. (2) plus education dummies     
Pooled .017 1.38 -.048** 1.97 
RE .041*** 3.14 .034 1.48 
FE .128*** 5.92 .152*** 5.00 
     
4. (3) plus firm attributes and 
industry dummies 
    
Pooled .039*** 3.15 .004 0.17 
RE .057*** 4.31 .052*** 2.33 
FE .130*** 5.95 .146*** 4.79 
     
5. (4) plus occupational 
dummies 
    
Pooled .066*** 5.43 .041* 1.79 
RE .076*** 5.90 .069*** 3.09 
FE .134*** 6.09 .147*** 4.79 
     
Notes:  
(i) Specification [1] contains only a constant and the part-time employment status dummy.  
(ii) Specification [2] also contains personal characteristics (onejob daywork contract casual  
tempagency, State/Territory, marital status, Australian-born, born in English speaking country, 
urban dummies, tenure and its squared, age and its square, experience and its square). The base 
is full-time worker in shift work on a permanent contract, not a casual worker, in NSW in a 
remote area, single, born in nes country. 
(iii) Specification [3] is as for [2] but with educational dummies added with the base being 
“missed high school”.  
(iv) Specification [4] adds in firm attributes and industry dummies (union member, 
establishment size, public sector, one-digit industry dummies).  The base is someone who is 
not a union member, who works in a very small private sector establishment (fewer than 20 
employees) in ‘other services’ industry. 
(v) Specification [5] adds in occupational dummies with the base being elementary clerical. 
(vi) The full set of estimates from Specification [3] are reported in Appendix Table A.2. 
(vii) *** denotes significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. 
 
 
Next consider Specification [2], containing all the additional individual 
characteristics as detailed in the notes under Table 1, including controls for casual status 
and for contract type. As shown in the second panel of Table 1, the RE and FE estimates 
of the part-time coefficient are now both positive and – for the FE model – statistically 
significant for both men and women.  
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Each of the additional specifications incrementally adds in blocks of explanatory 
variables, in the order given in the notes under the table. The FE estimates are preferred 
for all specifications and they show that part-time workers – once other observable and 
unobservable characteristics have been taken into account  -  earn a pay premium of 
between 13 and 15 log points over and above comparable full-time colleagues. We 
included occupational status dummy variables in the last specification, Specification [5], 
since occupation is potentially endogenous. Note that our estimated parameter of interest 
does not alter with the inclusion of this set of dummies. 
The FE estimates are identified from individuals changing their employment 
status between the two waves. For women, 147 changed from part-time to full-time status 
and 119 from full-time to part-time, yielding a total of 266 changers. For men, there are 
113 changers, comprising 64 men from part-time to full-time and 49 from full-time to 
part-time.  It is interesting that the majority of people who changed employment status 
did so without changing employer.8  
Even if one is skeptical about the FE estimates because of their reliance on a 
relatively small number of changers, the RE estimates – while considerably smaller – 
nonetheless suggest a clear pay premium for part-time work. From Table 1, it can be seen 
that the RE estimates of the part-time premium range from approximately 3 to 6% for 
women, and 3 to 7% for men. Even the OLS pooled estimates suggest a pay premium in 
Specifications [4] and [5]. 
Later we will speculate on why there is a part-time pay premium in Australia, but 
first we report the results of our robustness checks. 
 
3.3 Robustness checks 
Table 2 displays the results of a number of different robustness checks. To save 
space, we report the results only for Specification [3]. In the first panel of Table 2, we 
report the results of our investigation into measurement error. Our definition of part-time 
work was based on usual hours of work in the main job being less than 35 hours – the 
                                                          
8 Of the 147 women who changed employment status from part-time to full-time (between Waves 1 and 
2), 121 were asked if they changed employer. Some 74% stayed with the same employer. Of men in the 
same situation, 64% stayed with the same employer. For the 119 women who changed from full-time to 
part-time, 96 were asked if they changed employer and 70% stayed with the same employer. For men, 67 
out of 96 were asked this question and 70% stayed with the same employer. We also investigated those few 
cases who were not asked this question about job change and found that the majority of these were 
characterized by long tenures. Tables A.3.a and A.3.b report the mean characteristics of the job changers at 
waves 1 and 2 respectively. 
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ABS definition. But this could be subject to measurement error. Those who are at the 
margin might have been erroneously classified as part-time when they were actually full-
time, or vice versa. To take this possibility into account, in our first robustness check we 
dropped all cases whose reported usual hours of work in their main job lay in a band of 6 
hours around 35 hours. Thus we dropped men and women whose usual hours lay between 
32 and 37 hours inclusive. The pooled OLS, RE and FE estimates from this exercise are 
reported in the first panel of Table 2. Again the preferred estimates are the FE, which are 
now slightly larger compared to Specification [3] in Table 1 and still statistically 
significant. 
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Table 2: Robustness Checks of Part-time/Full-time Log Wage Differential 
 
 Women  Men  
Specification Coefficient  t-statistic  coefficient  t-statistic  
     
1. Omitting PT/FT borderline cases
(hrs>=32 and hrs<=37 dropped) 
    
Pooled .028** (2.04) -.044* (1.68) 
RE .047*** (3.19) .041 (1.61) 
FE .151*** (5.13) .202*** (5.63) 
Person-year observations 3485  3779  
     
2. Omitting cases < 5 hours     
Pooled .016 (1.26) -.050** (2.04) 
RE .041*** (3.11) .031 (1.36) 
FE .128*** (6.01) .149*** (4.89) 
Person-year observations 3938  4056  
     
3. Omitting cases < 10 hours     
Pooled .013 (1.05) -.065*** (2.59) 
RE .036*** (2.81) .024 (1.06) 
FE .115*** (5.57) .144*** (4.77) 
Person-year observations 3789  4009  
     
4. All hours, PT Dummies     
Pooled:   0-9 .139*** (5.04) .076 (1.43) 
             10-19 .031* (1.65) -.078* (1.75) 
             20-29 .018 (1.19) -.042 (1.27) 
             30-34 -.021 (1.12) -.090** (2.18) 
     
RE:         0-9 .201*** (7.13) .202*** (4.19) 
            10-19 .096*** (4.99) -.024  
            20-29 .027* (1.71) .066** (2.24) 
            30-34 -.004 (0.22) -.034 (0.97) 
     
FE:        0-9 .437*** (10.32) .375*** (6.02) 
           10-19 .294*** (9.68) .127** (2.49) 
            20-29 .093*** (3.69) .196*** (5.29) 
            30-34 .060** (2.33) .055 (1.30) 
     
Person-year observations 3988  4068  
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Table 2: Robustness Checks of Part-time/Full-time Log Wage Differential (continued) 
 
 Women  Men  
Specification Coefficient  t-statistic  coefficient  t-statistic   
     
5. All hours, PT Dummies, FT Dummy     
Pooled:   0-9 .205*** 6.82 .090* 1.67 
             10-19 .097*** 4.37 -.063 1.41 
             20-29 .083*** 4.29 -.029 0.84 
             30-34 .044* 1.95 -.076* 1.82 
FT        35-44 .088*** 5.43 .023* 1.80 
      
RE:         0-9 .286*** 9.34 .246*** 5.07 
            10-19 .181*** 7.95 .018 0.46 
            20-29 .111*** 5.51 .110*** 3.61 
            30-34 .080*** 3.59 .009 0.25 
FT       35-44 .108*** 6.75 .062*** 5.16 
      
FE:        0-9 .576*** 12.60 .466*** 7.46 
           10-19 .432*** 12.29 .215*** 4.16 
           20-29 .232*** 7.50 .289*** 7.49 
           30-34 .201*** 6.35 .145*** 3.36 
FT      35-44 .163*** 7.49 .121*** 7.67 
      
Person-year observations 3988  4068  
 
 
 As a second robustness check, we restored those observations described above 
and instead dropped from our estimating sub-sample all individuals whose usual hours 
were less than five.  We did this to eliminate from the sub-sample the noisy observations 
illustrated in Figure 2. In the second panel of Table 2, we report our estimates obtained 
from this sub-sample. Again we find that the estimates are similar to those for 
Specification [3] in Table 1, being approximately 13 and 15%  for women and men 
respectively. 
Third, we repeated this procedure on a further-reduced sub-sample in which we 
dropped all individuals whose usual hours were less than ten. These estimates are 
reported in Panel 3 and the FE estimates are approximately 12% and 15% for women and 
men respectively – ie slightly smaller for women. 
 Fourth, we restored those observations described above and – on our original  
sample – we re-estimated Specification [3] but replaced the single part-time dummy 
variable with four different dummies, representing very short hours (PT0-9), short hours 
(PT10-19); intermediate hours (PT20-29); and longer part-time hours (PT30-35). This 
quite flexible specification for hours of work has the advantage of allowing the returns to 
differ across the hours distribution. These estimates are reported in the bottom panels of 
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Table 2. Again the FE estimates are preferred. For both women and men, the part-time 
premium is largest for individuals working very short hours or working short hors, as 
compared with those whose working hours are closer to full-time. Of course there is a 
smaller number of workers making transitions across the various hours-of-work dummies 
so we recommend treating these estimates with caution. Nonetheless, they are interesting 
since they suggest that the pay premium declines with hours of work. 
Finally, we repeated the estimation with an additional dummy variable, FT35_44 
(representing usual weekly hours in the range 35-44), with the base being ‘more than 44 
hours’. Again the FE estimates are preferred, using the appropriate specification checks, 
although once again we would emphasise caution in interpreting these results because of 
the small number of changers across the hours categories. However, overall, the results in 
Table 2 confirm our findings in Table 1: that part-time workers – once other observable 
and unobservable characteristics have been taken into account  - earn a pay premium over 
and above comparable full-time colleagues. 
 
3.4 What Impact do other forms of flexible work have on wages? 
We now consider the impact of other forms of flexible work, in particular whether 
or not the individual is a casual worker, a temporary agency worker, or working in the 
day-time/shift etc., and how this differs across gender. To conserve space, we discuss 
only the results from Specification [3] – reported in full in Appendix Table 2 - but note 
that the results for these variables are very similar across specifications. Again the FE 
estimates are preferred and so we focus only on these. For women, part-time status and 
short-term contract are the only two employment type variables that are statistically 
significant. Women on short term contracts are paid approx 5% less than are women on 
permanent contracts (the RE estimate is very similar). For men, contract type is 
statistically insignificant but being a casual worker reduces hourly pay by approximately 
5 log points while being a temporary agency worker is associated with a wage premium 
of 14 log points (there is no effect for women). 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions
In the preceding analysis we established that, once account is taken of unobserved 
heterogeneity using panel data, part-time workers receive an hourly pay premium.  The 
magnitude of this is between 13 and 15%, ceteris paribus. We now consider why the 
observed part-time pay gaps in Australia are so large.  
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Hypotheses consistent with a positive premium for part-time work are the 
following. First, according to the efficiency hours hypothesis, part-time workers may be 
more productive because they are more focused on their jobs for a shorter time period 
each day and therefore are on the rising part of the hours-productivity hill. For this reason 
part-time workers might earn a pay premium that could swamp any pay penalty due to 
lower levels of experience capital. 
Second, part-time premia might reflect equilibrium market clearing rates where 
part-time jobs are plentiful but the supply is constrained. However this explanation does 
not seem plausible in the Australian context, where there is a high proportion of workers 
in part-time work.  
Third, the part-time pay premium could reflect the high effective marginal tax 
rates faced by relatively low-skilled second earners in Australia (Apps, 2004). As a 
consequence, firms with strong demand for part-time workers may have to pay more to 
attract these workers.  
Finally, Australia is characterized by a unique award system of rates and this may 
mean the part-time workers receive the benefits of the annual award system for covered 
workers. But high awards rates for part-time workers cannot be the whole story. If award 
rates were too high, employers would substitute full-time for part-time work. This is 
clearly not happening in Australia, where the proportion of part-time work has been 
steadily increasing over time. 
Of necessity our discussion of the causes of the part-time pay premia has been 
speculative. We hope that future work - with more waves of the HILDA data - might be 
able to investigate some of these hypotheses more fully. However a full investigation of 
some of the hypotheses relating to part-time pay premia – such as efficiency hours - 
would require linked employer-employee data, with information about firm’s production 
technology in addition to employee characteristics. 
 
 15
References 
Apps, Patricia F. (2004), “The High Taxation of Working Families”, Australian Review 
of Public Affairs, November. 
Blank, Rebecca M. (1990), “Are Part-time Jobs Lousy Jobs?” in Gary Burtless (ed.) A 
Future of Lousy Jobs?, The Brookings Institute, Washington DC. 
Booth, Alison L. and Martin Ravallion (1993), “Employment and Length of the Working 
Week in a Unionised Economy in which Hours of Work Influence Productivity”, 
The Economic Record, 69, 428-36. 
Ermisch, John  and Robert E. Wright (1992), “Wage Offers and Full-time and Part-time 
Employment of British Women”, Journal of Human Resources, 28, 111-132. 
Hawke, Anne E. (1993), “Full- and Part-Time Work and Wages: An Application to two 
Countries”. PhD Thesis, Australian National University. 
Hirsch, Barry T. (2004) “Why Do Part-Time Workers Earn Less? The Role of Worker 
and Job Skills” IZA DP No. 1261. 
Main, Brian G.M. (1988), “Hourly Earnings of Female Part-time versus Full-time 
Employees”, The Manchester School, 56, 331-344.  
Pocock, Barbara (1995), “Women’s Work and Wages”, in Anne Edwards and Susan 
Magarey (eds) Women in a Restructuring Australia, Allen and Unwin. 
Rodgers, J.R. (2004), “Hourly Wages Of Full-Time And Part-Time Employees in 
Australia”, Australian Journal of Labour Economics, 7, 231-54, June. 
Simpson W. (1986), “Analysis of Part-time Pay in Canada”, Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 19, 798-807. 
Wooden, Mark and  Diana Warren (2003), “The Characteristics of casual and Fixed-term 
Employment: Evidence from the HILDA Survey”. Melbourne Institute Working 
Paper No. 15/03. 
 
 16
Appendix Table A.1: Means for Full-time and Part-time (Main Job)  
Men and Women for Selected Variables 
 Women Men 
 Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time 
Work Attributes     
Log hourly earnings 2.846 2.798 2.983 2.778 
Usual hours per week in main job 42.092 20.582 45.308 20.431 
Casual 0.063 0.429 0.060 0.632 
Fixed term contract 0.115 0.087 0.096 0.083 
Employed through a labour hire firm 0.025 0.037 0.030 0.060 
One job only 0.946 0.840 0.940 0.758 
Regular daytime schedule (main job) 0.834 0.671 0.779 0.537 
Tenure with current employer (years) 6.865 5.268 7.733 3.203 
Tenure in current occupation (years) 8.956 8.814 10.137 5.212 
Trade union member 0.374 0.281 0.376 0.224 
Public sector  0.375 0.305 0.247 0.212 
     
     
Demographics     
Age 38.240 39.460 38.719 35.383 
Experience 17.592 17.012 20.440 15.822 
Married 0.465 0.619 0.610 0.406 
Cohabiting 0.156 0.100 0.123 0.083 
Urban 0.677 0.584 0.662 0.630 
Inner regional 0.218 0.285 0.238 0.264 
Outer regional (base is remote/very remote) 0.084 0.116 0.080 0.086 
Australian born 0.772 0.796 0.769 0.761 
Born in English speaking country (not Oz) 0.104 0.101 0.117 0.086 
     
Education dummy variables:     
postgraduate degree (masters or doctorate) 0.040 0.019 0.046 0.035 
grad diploma, grad certificate 0.098 0.080 0.059 0.048 
Bachelor degree 0.220 0.144 0.164 0.159 
advanced diploma, diploma 0.128 0.095 0.087 0.093 
certificate iii or iv 0.113 0.122 0.300 0.159 
certificate i or ii 0.064 0.073 0.037 0.053 
certificate not defined  0.038 0.069 0.028 0.033 
Year 12 0.119 0.144 0.103 0.229 
Year 11 0.163 0.227 0.174 0.184 
Missed high (base) 0.016 0.026 0.006 0.008 
     
Number of person-year observations 2174 1814 3671 397 
     
 
 17
Appendix Table A.2 (a) WOMEN, Specification [3] 
 
 Pooled OLS Random Effect Fixed Effect 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
emppt 0.0171 1.38 0.0413*** 3.14 0.1285*** 5.92 
onejob -0.0413** 2.31 -0.0283 1.60 -0.0122 0.50 
daywork -0.0268** 2.09 -0.0212 1.58 -0.0129 0.62 
contract -0.0396** 2.19 -0.0460*** 2.65 -0.0489** 2.16 
casual -0.0661*** 4.37 -0.0596*** 3.85 -0.0242 1.06 
tempagency 0.0621** 1.97 0.0537* 1.79 0.0354 0.92 
vic -0.0662*** 4.53 -0.0658*** 3.73 0.0613 0.59 
qld -0.0789*** 5.07 -0.0799*** 4.25 -0.0496 0.48 
sa -0.1139*** 5.61 -0.1105*** 4.49 0.1527 0.73 
wa -0.0812*** 3.92 -0.0798*** 3.19 0.0162 0.10 
tas -0.0469 1.41 -0.0501 1.26 -0.0071 0.04 
nt 0.0062 0.10 0.0309 0.43 0.3346 1.19 
act -0.0158 0.44 -0.0106 0.24 0.2434 0.88 
marr 0.0529*** 3.15 0.0450** 2.31 0.0336 0.63 
cohab 0.0335* 1.73 0.0266 1.24 0.0083 0.20 
wds 0.0361* 1.70 0.0294 1.20 0.0163 0.27 
born_oz 0.0418** 2.40 0.0387* 1.83 (dropped)  
born_engsp 0.0708*** 3.07 0.0697** 2.48 (dropped)  
urban 0.0358 0.88 0.0331 0.72 -0.0029 0.03 
innreg 0.0005 0.01 0.0057 0.12 0.0181 0.18 
outreg -0.0161 0.37 -0.0240 0.50 -0.0448 0.46 
tenure 0.0110*** 4.80 0.0090*** 3.58 -0.0017 0.38 
tensq -0.0002*** 2.25 -0.0001 1.48 0.0001 0.42 
hgage 0.0154*** 2.59 0.0138* 1.91 -0.0568 1.10 
agesq -0.0002*** 2.70 -0.0002** 2.03 0.0009 1.56 
exper 0.0144*** 4.17 0.0161*** 3.84 -0.0329 0.78 
expersq -0.0003*** 3.75 -0.0003*** 3.40 -0.0015** 2.39 
postgrad 0.2447*** 7.25 0.2740*** 6.81 0.2018 1.05 
graddip 0.2339*** 10.18 0.2513*** 9.33 0.0096 0.09 
bachelor 0.1666*** 8.73 0.1809*** 8.12 -0.1103 1.16 
cert3or4 -0.1243*** 5.79 -0.1076*** 4.32 0.0170 0.22 
cert1or2 -0.1667*** 6.67 -0.1476*** 5.05 -0.0350 0.38 
certnd -0.1015*** 3.68 -0.0919*** 2.82 -0.0967 0.78 
year12 -0.0739*** 3.51 -0.0546** 2.31 -0.0456 0.87 
year11 -0.2042*** 10.57 -0.1764*** 8.16 0.0417 0.89 
wave2 0.0196* 1.85 0.0195** 2.53 0.1013** 2.21 
_cons 2.3869*** 22.20 2.3783*** 18.54 4.6331*** 3.24 
Notes: Breusch Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for Random Effect model has the value of 
χ²=420.17 which is highly significant at the 5% level significance. Hausman test statistics of 
χ²=109.85 is highly significant at 5% level. t-value of each variables are reported below the 
corresponding coefficients. *, **, *** denote significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level 
respectively. 
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Appendix Table A.2 (b) MEN, Specification [3] 
 
 Pooled OLS Random Effect Fixed Effect 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
emppt -0.0482** 1.97 0.0339 1.48 0.1522*** 5.00 
onejob -0.0001 0.01 -0.0238 1.15 -0.0513** 1.98 
daywork -0.0551*** 3.89 -0.0299** 2.13 0.0053 0.27 
contract 0.0400** 1.93 0.0173 0.98 0.0087 0.42 
casual -0.0243 1.04 -0.0526*** 2.57 -0.0547** 2.20 
tempagency 0.0641* 1.85 0.1118*** 3.75 0.1389*** 3.92 
vic -0.0207 1.28 -0.0205 0.99 0.0626 0.61 
qld -0.0767*** 4.50 -0.0874*** 4.02 -0.3381*** 2.76 
sa -0.1760*** 7.69 -0.1740*** 5.95 0.0919 0.51 
wa -0.0890*** 4.03 -0.0895*** 3.17 -0.0588 0.33 
tas -0.0925** 2.40 -0.1175*** 2.41 -0.5248** 2.09 
nt -0.0619 0.67 -0.1007 0.93 -0.0895 0.34 
act 0.0521 1.27 0.0399 0.78 -0.3175* 1.74 
marr 0.1615*** 8.79 0.1424*** 6.56 0.0318 0.64 
cohab 0.1291*** 5.82 0.1026*** 4.38 0.0396 1.06 
Wds 0.1044*** 3.60 0.1007*** 3.12 0.0432 0.75 
born_oz 0.0941*** 4.80 0.0906*** 3.58 (dropped)  
born_engsp 0.1683*** 6.74 0.1715*** 5.30 (dropped)  
urban -0.1089** 2.49 -0.1135** 2.44 -0.2028*** 2.60 
innreg -0.2053*** 4.57 -0.1824*** 3.86 -0.1913** 2.56 
outreg -0.2176*** 4.61 -0.1889*** 3.90 -0.1246* 1.74 
tenure 0.0080*** 3.47 0.0073*** 2.84 0.0015 0.32 
tensq -0.0000 0.17 -0.0000 0.15 0.0001 0.58 
hgage 0.0360*** 4.13 0.0362*** 3.26 0.0099 0.15 
agesq -0.0005*** 4.78 -0.0005*** 3.75 -0.0000 0.08 
exper 0.0092* 1.95 0.0112* 1.86 -0.0044 0.11 
expersq -0.0000 0.09 -0.0001 0.39 -0.0006 0.78 
postgrad 0.2365*** 6.70 0.2584*** 5.89 0.0382 0.23 
graddip 0.1604*** 5.05 0.1713*** 4.38 -0.0882 0.67 
bachelor 0.1384*** 5.58 0.1488*** 4.89 -0.0930 0.90 
cert3or4 -0.1610*** 7.14 -0.1419*** 5.15 -0.0815 0.87 
cert1or2 -0.2671*** 7.38 -0.2523*** 5.68 -0.2699** 2.11 
certnd -0.2330*** 5.83 -0.2099*** 4.30 -0.1607 1.20 
year12 -0.1219*** 4.53 -0.0972*** 3.06 -0.1280* 1.75 
year11 -0.2520*** 10.36 -0.2179*** 7.49 0.0889 1.22 
wave2 0.0196* 1.66 0.0211*** 3.02 0.0560 1.25 
_cons 2.2624*** 15.54 2.2336*** 12.31 3.3471** 2.14 
Notes: Breusch Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for Random Effect model has  the value of 
χ²=837.99 which is highly significant at the 5% level significance. Hausman test statistics of 
χ²=123.6 is highly significant at 5% level. t-value of each variables are reported below the 
corresponding coefficients. *, **, *** denote significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level 
respectively. 
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